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The first sub-prime mortgage crisis and its aftermath 

Introduction

Financial markets in the years and months leading up to the financial crisis of 2007–08 were characterised by growth in the shadow banking sector, pyramiding and hidden leverage in the consumer and financial sectors, off-balance sheet financing by systemically important firms, and mortgage securitisation and other “creative” financing schemes that some say resembled games of “hot potato” and “hide the sausage”. The failure of a prominent financial institution triggered an eventual full collapse in stock prices, resulting in, among other things, a foreclosure crisis with long-lasting negative spillovers into the real economy.

Many believe the recent crisis to be unprecedented, where, for example, Hyun Song Shin (2010) wrote: “The global financial crisis that erupted in the summer of 2007 has the distinction of being the first post-securitisation crisis in which banking and capital market developments have been clearly intertwined.” In this speech I will present research I am conducting on the US panic of 1857 that contradicts Professor Shin’s observation, where the 1857 panic bore eerie similarities to the more recent panic.

The older panic, which occurred almost exactly 150 years prior to the more recent panic, had, in addition to the factors noted above, global capital flows emanating primarily from England and the Continent with clearly intertwined banking and capital markets. And, although sub-prime mortgage lending and securitisation were perhaps not as widespread as they were in the current crisis, they played a very central role in propagating the panic from a few strategically placed firms located near the frontier of the Old Northwest back east to New York City and Europe.

It is said that every crisis is similar and that every crisis is different. Identification of the relevant similarities and differences requires memory and retained knowledge, where this knowledge can be gained and retained in different guises. The broader objective of this speech is to argue that historical perspective, and more generally inductive methods to research, provides a strong complement to more traditional deductive research methods such as large-sample econometric analysis.

This speech is organised in three acts. The first act sketches the background of the US economy in the years and months leading up to the crisis of 1857 (which occurred in late August and lasted through October of that year). The second act analyses the sub-prime mortgages and their securities that existed at the time, which were known as the railroad farm mortgage (RRFM) and the RRFM-backed security. The third and final act considers the failure of the prominent financial institution that triggered the panic, and the panic’s aftermath as it specifically related to the RRFMs and their securities.

Link al Paper

An ecological perspective on the future of computer trading

We adopt an ecological microstructure perspective of financial markets and use it to consider the impact of computer trading on the fairness, competitiveness and stability of markets now and in the future. The ecological perspective is particularly appropriate for computer trading because it has increased specialization and has made the behaviour and interactions of agents in the market much more systematic and measurable than when trading based on human judgment was dominant. We view regulatory policy as a key element of the ecology itself and a key driver shaping markets of the future. After reviewing a number of important trends in market ecology, we conclude that immediate regulatory initiative is necessary for careful measurement of market ecology with the related goals of (1) developing real-time warning signals for systemic risk; (2) informing an evidence-based approach to systemic stability policy and to competition policy that properly accounts for the multi-platform nature of modern financial markets; and (3) building a deeper theoretical understanding of markets based on large-scale simulations.

Link al Paper

Evidence of market manipulation in the financial crisis

Abstract

We provide direct evidence of market manipulation at the beginning of the financial crisis November 2007. The type of market manipulation, a “bear raid,” would have been prevented by a regulation that was repealed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in July 2007. The regulation, the uptick rule, was designed to prevent market manipulation and promote stability and was in force from 1938 as a key part of the government response to the 1928 market crash and its aftermath. On November 1, 2007, Citigroup experienced an unusual increase in trading volume and decrease in price. Our analysis of financial industry data shows that this decline coincided with an anomalous increase in borrowed shares, the selling of which would be a large fraction of the total trading volume. The selling of borrowed shares cannot be explained by news events as there is no corresponding increase in selling by share owners. A similar number of shares were returned on a single day six days later. The magnitude and coincidence of borrowing and returning of shares is evidence of a concerted effort to drive down Citigroup’s stock price and achieve a profit, i.e., a bear raid. Interpretations and analyses of financial markets should consider the possibility that the intentional actions of individual actors or coordinated groups can impact market behavior. Markets are not sufficiently transparent to reveal or prevent even major market manipulation events. Our results point to the need for regulations that prevent intentional actions that cause markets to deviate from equilibrium value and contribute to market crashes. Enforcement actions, even if they take place, cannot reverse severe damage to the economic system. The current “alternative” uptick rule which is only in effect for stocks dropping by over 10% in a single day is insufficient. Prevention may be achieved through a combination of improved transparency through availability of market data and the original uptick rule or other transaction process limitations.

Link al Paper

En este capítulo, Leandro -vía Skype desde NY- le explica a Gaston qué es el Alfa, cómo es la generación del mismo, qué diferencias existen entre un trader tradicional y un trader de Alta Frecuencia.

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Tal vez es una serie de post más para finanzas 301, pero los ultimos 3 post de Quantivity hacen un buen capitulo de Hedging.

Proxy / Cross Hedging

“The root challenge of two current equity risk and alpha projects boil down to hedging using non-underlying instruments, known as proxy hedging or cross hedging.”

Empirical Quantiles and Proxy Selection

“(…)how to choose an appropriate hedge instrument, especially amongst several alternatives.”

Empirical Copulas and Hedge Basis Risk

“Of particular interest is understanding the dynamics of basis risk under extreme scenarios (both up and down), which are driven by time-varying stochastic joint covariation.”