Tag Archive | "debt"

Gráfico du Jour: Para Grecia, más pochoclo….

Gráfico du Jour: Para Grecia, más pochoclo….

(Fuente: Greece’s debt exchange, Fixed Income Research, Credit Suisse, 27 February 2012)

 

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Paper: Reestructuración “ordenada” de la Deuda griega

Paper: Reestructuración “ordenada” de la Deuda griega

Engineering an Orderly Greek Debt Restructuring

Abstract: 
For some months now, discussions over how Greece will restructure its debt have been constrained by the requirement that the deal be “voluntary” – implying that Greece would continue debt service to any creditors that choose retain their old bonds rather than tender them in an exchange offer. In light of Greece’s deep solvency problems and lack of agreement with its creditors so far, the notion of a voluntary debt exchange is increasingly looking like a mirage. In this essay, we describe and compare three alternative approaches that would achieve an orderly restructuring but avoid an outright default: (1) “retrofitting” and using a collective action clause (CAC) that would allow the vast majority of outstanding Greek government bonds to be restructured with the consent of a supermajority of creditors; (2) combining the use of a CAC with an exit exchange, in which consenting bondholders would receive a new English-law bond with standard creditor protections and lower face value; (3) an exit exchange in which a CAC would only be used if participation falls below a specified threshold. All three exchanges are involuntary in the sense that creditors that dissent or hold out are not repaid in full.

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Gráfico du Jour: Deuda Grecia, Proyecciones

Gráfico du Jour: Deuda Grecia, Proyecciones

(Fuente: Perspective de Marché, BNP Paribas, 14 February 2012)

 

 

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Paper: Información y Leverage

Paper: Información y Leverage

Collateral Crises

Abstract

Short-term collateralized debt, private money, is efficient if agents are willing to lend without producing costly information about the collateral backing the debt. When the economy relies on such informationally-insensitive debt, firms with low quality collateral can borrow, generating a credit boom and an increase in output. Financial fragility builds up over time as information about counterparties decays. A crisis occurs when a small shock causes agents to suddenly have incentives to produce information, leading to a decline in output. A social planner would produce more information than private agents, but would not always want to eliminate fragility.

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Grafico du Jour: Tenencia china de deuda US

Grafico du Jour: Tenencia china de deuda US

(Fuente: Global Macro Monitor, via Creditwritedowns.com)

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Gráfico du Jour: Deuda soberana, ¿Quién la tiene?

Gráfico du Jour: Deuda soberana, ¿Quién la tiene?

(Fuente: Credit Writedowns)

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